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Meiropolitan Governmeni: Minnesota's Experiment
with a Metropolitan Council
[E]xisting governments have little relation to the region as
such, which in organizational terms is amorphous and un-
crystallized. The metropolitan area has no capital, courthouse,
or city hall, no corporate existence, no body, no soul, no sense
of being, indeed no being in any concrete meaning of the term.
Al Smith was from the sidewalks of New York, not from the
sidewalks of the New York-Northeastern New Jersey Standard
Consolidated Area. Davenport-Rock Island-Moline is not a
place name but a shelter designed to afford the statistician
refuge from political fallout.'
I. INTRODUCTION
Relocations in population, industry, finance, and racial bal-
ances have created metropolitan problems of staggering magni-
tude.2 The great needs for more and better housing, transporta-
tion, crime prevention, sanitation, pollution control, recreation
and education programs have motivated governmental responses
from many levels. However, such responses have often been
handicapped by structural defects in the various systems of gov-
ernment involved,3 such as the multitudinous fragmentation and
overlapping nature of governmental units4 in our metropolitan
areas and their lack of resources to attack area-wide problems.5
The relationship among units is often characterized by competi-
tion rather than coordination 6 and interests of the metropolitan
area as a whole go without consideration in the decisions of any
single unit. Attempts are being made on two fronts to cure the
1. R. MARTIN, METROPOLIS IN TRANSITION 141 (1963).
2. In recent years an increasing amount of scholarly attention has
been focused on these problems. Woodbury, Some Notes on the Study
of Urban Government, 12 PUB. POLICY 113 (1963). See generally FOR-
TUNE, THE EXPLODING METROPOLIS (1958); J. GOTTMAN, MEGALOPOLIS
(1961); S. GREE, GOVERNING THE METRPorojs (1962); E. GUTLID,
THE TWILIGHT OF THE CITIES (1962); Y. WILLBERN, THE WITHERING AWAY
OF THE CITIES (1964); R. WOOD, SUBURBIA: ITS PEOPLE AND THEM POLITICS
(1958).
3. Cutler, Can Local Government Handle Urban Growth?, 1959
Wis. L. REV. 5; UNITED STATES ADVISORY COMMISSION ON INTERGOVERN-
ERNMENTAL RELATION [hereinafter cited as ACIR], REPORT ON GovERNMEN-
TAL STRUCTURE, ORGANIZATION, AND PLANNING IN METROPOLITAN AREAS,
SUBMITTED TO THE HOUSE COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS, 87
Cong., 1st Sess. (Comm. Print 1961) [hereinafter cited as ACIR, Gov-
ERNMENT STRUCTURE].
4. ACIR, GOVERNMENT STRUCTURE 12-14.
5. See Walker, Fiscal Aspects of Metropolitan Regional Develop-
ment, 105 U. PA. L. REV. 489, 491.
6. R. WooD, 1400 GOVERNMENTS 73-79, 112-113 (1961).
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problems of fragmented government in metropolitan areas. The
first is an attempt to revamp and reorganize local governments.7
The second is recent federal legislation which has imposed as a
condition to receiving federal funds for various projects, the es-
tablishment of a metropolitan wide regional coordinating agen-
cy.8
In response to multijurisdictional metropolitan problems
and the incentive of federal funding, Minnesota has created a
unique experiment in metropolitan area government, the Metro-
politan Council. It is the purpose of this Note to examine the
problems of fragmented government in metropolitan areas and
to analyze and evaluate three of the significant schemes de-
vised to remedy these problems. Particular emphasis will be
devoted to the Metropolitan Council as a governmental device
which provides a framework to meet area-wide problems.
II. FRAGMENTATION: PROBLEMS AND PARADOXES
A. THE SPILLOVER EFFECT
An economic premise known as the "spillover effect"O is
inherent in metropolitan areas governed by fragmented and over-
lapping governmental units. This concept is often used to de-
scribe the benefits and detriments which accrue to one com-
munity in the metropolitan area as a result of another unit's
action or inaction. To illustrate, numerous activities of the cen-
tral city benefit the suburbs, such as mass transit and traffic
control which benefit the suburban commuter. Similarly, effi-
cient sewage treatment in one suburban jurisdiction along a river
will benefit another downstream. Finally, the benefits derived
from functions such as public health measures or the operation
of a first-rate school system in one jurisdiction clearly inure to
the entire metropolitan area.10
However, the frequent lack of identity between the popula-
tion which receives substantial immediate or indirect benefits
7. ACIR, ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES TO GOVERNMENTAL REORGANI-
ZATION IN METROPOLITAN AREAs (1962) [hereinafter cited as ACIR, AL-
ERNATIVE APPROACHES]; COMMITTEE FOR ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, MOD-
ERNIZING LOCAL GOVERNMENT (1966).
8. E.g., Demonstration Cities and Metropolitan Development Act
of 1966, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3301-3374 (Supp. H, 1967).
9. J. BOLLENS & H. SCHMANDT, THE METROPOLIS 367, (1965); B.
FRIEDEN, METROPOLITAN AMERICA: CHALLENGE TO FEDERALISM, SUBMITTED
TO THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE HOUSE
COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (Comm.
Print 1966).
10. J. BOLLENS, supra note 9, at 367.
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and the jurisdiction which finances the project makes it im-
possible to relate services and benefits to taxes. Thus, the city
dweller may be taxed for roads and transportation facilities used
primarily by commuters, and the suburbanite who lives upstream
may be taxed to clean up an already polluted river which flows
into other jurisdictions." In addition, local government units
may be reluctant to undertake building certain public facilities if
the decision makers are aware that the facilities will benefit
an area beyond the taxing jurisdiction.12 Alternatively, if it does
construct public facilities, there may be attempts, subject to
constitutional questions, to exclude outsiders and preserve the
facility for those who paid for it.' 3 There is also the difficulty
encountered in financing solutions to present local needs since
the central city-often the "breeder" of area economic activity-
can not tax or control significant portions of the wealth it gen-
erates' 4 and much of this wealth flows to the jurisdictionally
independent suburbs.
This pattern of development produces serious financial in-
equities in the metropolitan area. People of similar socio-
economic status living in similar housing, yet residing in differ-
ent jurisdictions may pay vastly different prices for the cost of
local government services received.' 5 Thus, the exodus from the
central city of the relatively higher income groups and the cor-
responding migration to the city of relatively lower income
11. B. FRIEDEN, supra note 9, at 6.
12. F. Schoettle, Jr., The City and The Metropolitan Area: Legal
Structure and Values 9, October 20, 1967 (unpublished paper prepared
for the Experimental City Seminar on file at University of Minnesota
Law School).
13. See, e.g., Schreiber v. City of Rye, 53 Misc. 2d 259, 278 N.Y.S.2d
527 (Westchester County Ct. 1967). Plaintiff, a resident of another city,
applied for and was refused a permit to use a municipal golf course and
swimming pool acquired and maintained by public funds from the City
of Rye. Plaintiff claimed that the restriction of the use of public facil-
ities to residents of the city was an unlawful discrimination in violation
of the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. The court
rejected this argument and held that the city had wide discretion in
the classification of persons who may benefit from public facilities,
and that the discrimination was not invidious.
14. Harris, The Economic Aspects of the Metropolitan Region, 105
U. PA. L. Rxv. 464, 468 (1957).
15. Sherwood, Some Major Problems of Metropolitan Areas, in
METROPOLITAN CALIFORNIA, GoVERNoR's COnMISSlON ON METROPOLITAN
AREA PROBLEMS 18 (E. Engelbert, ed. 1961). The author states:
"[T] hough the City of Los Angeles may have 10,000 times the population
of the City of Vernon, it has only 20 times the assessed valuation. The
property tax base in Vernon amounts to $1,000,000 per person, ap-
proximately; in Los Angeles it is $1,600." See also R. WooD, THE
METROPOLIS AGAINST ITSELF 23-39 (1959).
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groups results in increased costs to the city in terms of housing
and welfare accompanied by a diminished revenue potential.'6
Similarly the wealth of suburbs varies. The problem from the
point of view of many suburbs which have absorbed the major
share of the total growth in the nation is how to accommo-
date the increasing demand for public services. Suburbs must
provide many new services, such as roads, schools, and sewage
facilities requiring large capital expenditures.
One result of this disparity, not only between the central city
and the suburbs but also among suburbs is competition among
local jurisdictions for tax revenue-producing activities and land
uses. One author described the use of zoning as a control to
guide growth in this context as "municipal mercantilism" or a
"beggar-thy-neighbor policy.'' 17 The goal is to preserve exist-
ing property values and tax base and in the alternative or simul-
taneously, depending on the circumstances, pursue industrial pro-
motion policies. A community often is able, through zoning and
planning, to apportion the land within its territory between
"net-revenue-producing" and "net-revenue-using" property and
thereby attempt to achieve a balance.' 8 Therefore, the initial
decision on future industrial or residential development in subur-
ban areas often turns on the question of whether the property
tax received by the municipality exceeds and offsets the cost of
providing government services, 9 with no consideration of the
metropolitan area as a whole.
Furthermore, evidence of detrimental aspects of the spillover
effect may be found in parochial local ordinances governing land
use which are inconsistent with metropolitan interests.20 For
example, municipalities have used zoning ordinances to prohibit
certain land uses deemed objectionable,2 ' or have imposed mini-
16. The ACIR 1968 LTEGISLAT£vn PRORGAm 259-63 (1967) suggests
legislation under which a state could, by devising a distribution formula
based upon tax load, channel state aid to those districts with the highest
effective tax rates. The goal of this legislation is to equalize fiscal
disparities without disturbing local governmental organization.
17. R. WooD, 1400 GOVEaNMENTS 78 (1961).
18. Id. at 77.
19. Walker, supra note 5, at 496.
20. Certain California cities have, through the use of municipal
powers, profited at the expense of the metropolitan area. Examples
include municipal encouragement of draw poker contrary to a general
prohibition, promotion of an industrial haven, and the preservation of
agricultural uses (dairy) through zoning. Sherwood, supra note 15,
at 18.
21. Often prohibited uses are struck down by the courts because
of the demonstrable social utility of the use. See, e.g., University Heights
v. Cleveland Jewish Orphans Home, 20 F.2d 743 (8th Cir.), cert. denied,
19681
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
mum lot size requirements to exclude families with lower income.
Illustrative of the latter is the recent case of National Land and
Investment Company v. Kohn.22 Easttown Township, under
pressure of population expansion from eastern Philadelphia sub-
urbs enacted a four-acre minimum lot size, ostensibly to insure
proper sewage disposal, protect against water pollution, and pre-
serve the character of the neighborhood. Applying the due
process standard,23 the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania held that
the four-acre requirement was unconstitutional as applied. The
court stated in dictum:
It is not difficult to envision the tremendous hardship as well
as the chaotic conditions which would result if all the town-
ships in this area decided to deny to a growing population sites
for residential development within the means of at least a
significant segment of the people.24
275 U.S. 569 (1927) (home for children); American University v. Pren-
tiss, 113 F. Supp. 389 (D.D.C. 1953) (hospital); City of Chicago v. Sacks,
1 Ill. 2d 342, 115 N.E.2d 762 (1953) (school); Board of Zoning Appeals
v. Decatur Co. of Jehovah's Witnesses, 233 Ind. 83, 117 N.E.2d 115 (1954)
(church); Hofstra College v. Wilmerling, 24 Misc. 2d 248, 204 N.Y.S.2d
476 (Spec. Term 1960), appeal dismissed, 12 App. Div. 2d 631, 210 N.Y.S.
2d 791 (1960). See generally Note, Zoning Against the Public Welfare:
Judicial Limitations on Municipal Parochialism, 71 YALE L.J. 720 (1962).
22. 419 Pa. 504, 215 A.2d 597 (1965). See Comment, 114 U. PA.
L. REv. 1251 (1966).
23. The due process clause limits the exercise of the police power
through zoning. It requires that a zoning ordinance bear a reasonable
relation to the public health, safety, morals or general welfare. Village
of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926). In this landmark
case the Supreme Court, passing on a zoning ordinance which excluded
industry from a Cleveland suburb, foreshadowed the possibility of an
overriding metropolitan interest:
The village, though physically a suburb of Cleveland, is politi-
cally a separate municipality, with powers of its own and au-
thority to govern itself as it sees fit within the limits of the
organic Law of its creation and the State and Federal Consti-
tutions .... It is not meant by this, however, to exclude the
possibility of cases where the general public interest would so
far outweigh the interest of the municipality that the munici-
pality would not be allowed to stand in the way.
272 U.S. at 389-90.
24. 419 Pa. at 528, 215 A.2d at 610. Compare the statement of the
New Jersey Superior Court, Law Division, in holding that a township
zoning ordinance which restricted construction of residence in a strictly
rural area upon a plot of less than five acres was not unreasonable per
se:
The manifest design of modern judicial approach is to save
a repetition of the blighting slums that are in many cases the
by-product of living in highly industrialized communities with
the resultant depreciation of surrounding property values and
the creation of a source of infection of the body social .... To
a lesser extent this condition persists in suburban communities
on the periphery of these highly industrialized areas and the
attempt has been to contain rather than permit an extension of
[Vol. 53:122
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Another example of municipal parochialism with a potential
detrimental metropolitan impact is seen in Borough of Cresskill
v. Borough of Dumon 25 where defendant borough, Dumont,
amended its zoning ordinance to change a certain block from a
residential zone to a business district. The block in question was
bounded by three other boroughs, all of which joined several
residents of each borough in initiating the complaint, charging
that the amendatory ordinance was not in accordance with the
comprehensive regional zoning plans of the neighboring boroughs.
Specifically the amendment failed
to take into consideration the physical, economic, and social
conditions prevailing throughout the entire area .. .and that
regard was given solely to the political boundaries of . . .Du-
mont in utter disregard of the contiguous residential areas of
the plaintiff's boroughs. 26
The lower court invalidated the ordinance, holding it was
almost inevitable that an adjoining municipality would be af-
fected by zoning regulations adopted along its boarder by a con-
tiguous municipality.2 7 On appeal the Supreme Court of New
Jersey affirmed but rejected the reasoning of the lower court and
invalidated the ordinance on the grounds of spot zoning within
the terms of the local ordinance. However, a statement by the
court suggests that local units of general jurisdiction may have to
look at the possible regional impact when considering zoning.28
B. THE PANcAKE PHENOMENON
Despite patent interdependence of economic interests among
metropolitan area residents inherent in the "spillover effect,"
however, the present status of government in metropolitan areas
is frequently disorganized, diffused, stagnant, and frustrating.
To examine this phenomenon, a standard definition of what con-
stitutes a metropolitan region is required. The most widely
used definition is the "standard metropolitan statistical area"
(SMSA) employed by the United States Bureau of the Census.
According to this definition, "each SMSA contains at least one
central city and adjacent counties that are found to be metro-
building processes which will break down such relatively small
amounts of property as are still susceptible of protection.
Fischer v. Township of Bedminister, 21 N.J. Super. 81, 87, 90 A.2d 757,
760, affd, 11 N.J. 194, 93 A.2d 378 (1952).
25. 15 N.J. 238, 104 A.2d 441 (1954).
26. Id. at 240, 104 A.2d at 442.
27. Borough of Cresskill v. Borough of Dumont, 28 N.J. Super. 26,
43, 100 A.2d 182, 191 (1953). See generally Note, Zoning: Looking
Beyond Municipal Borders, 1965 WASH. L.Q. 107.
28. 15 N.J. at 247, 104 A.2d at 445-46.
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politan in character and economically and socially integrated
with the county of the central city. ' 29 The central city must
contain not less than 50,000 population, or if there are two con-
tiguous cities which represent a community for social and eco-
nomic purposes there must be a combined population of at
least 50,000. SMSA's may cross state lines.30  The 1960 Census
of Population showed nearly two-thirds of the population of
the United States-113 million of 179 million people-residing
in 212 SMSA's.3 1
Clearly, however, the most material characteristic of metro-
politan areas which can be dramatically illustrated by the use of
statistics is the confusing and complex pattern of governmental
units functioning in the area. The 1962 Census of Government
found 91,186 local units of government in the United States.
The average number per state was 1,825; Minnesota had the
fourth highest number of local units with 5,213.32 Many SMSA's
contain literally hundreds of governmental units whose terri-
tories often partially overlap. The Committee for Economic De-
velopment referred to Fridley, Minnesota, a city within the Min-
neapolis-St. Paul SMSA as a "believe it or not" situation because
there were eleven overlapping layers of government. These con-
tributed to the confusion and apathy of local voters who were
expected to exercise informed control over these superimposed
governments through the electoral franchise.3 3  The jurisdic-
29. UNITED STATES BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT
or THE UNnD STATES 897 (1967).
30. Id.
31. UNITED STATES BUREAU OF TE CENSUS, supra note 29, at 11.
A more recent survey has disclosed an increase in the total number of
SMSA's from 212 in 1960 to 231 in 1967. UNITED STATES BUREAU OF
THE BUDGET, STANDARD METROPOLITAN STATISTICAL AREAS (1967). During
the period from 1940 to 1960 the proportion of the total population living
in SMSA's increased from fifty-five per cent to sixty-three per cent,
ACIR, ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES at 5. During the decade of the fifties,
eighty-four per cent of the total population growth occurred in metro-
politan areas. R. MARTIN, THE CITIES AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 14 (1965)
[hereinafter cited as CITIES].
The Secretary of Housing and Urban Development said:
This growth is the most portentious single fact of our time-
always excepting the thermonuclear threat. It means, among
other things, that in the next thirty-five or forty years we may
have to build as much housing, industrial plants, and highways
as we have built in our previous history [sic]. In the process,
the amount of land consumed by urbanization will be doubled.
R. WEAVER, DILEMMAS or URBAN AMERICA 3 (1965).
32. 1 UNITED STATES BUREAU OF CENsuS, CENSUS OF GOVERNMENTS,
GOVERNMENT ORGANIZATION 1-10 (1962). See also 5 LOCAL GOVERNMENT
EN METROPOLITAN AREAS 2 (1962).
33, COMIiTTEE FOR EcoNo vIc DEVELOPMENT, MODERNIZING LOCAL
[Vol. 53:122
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tional overlap in SMSA's such as in the case of Fridley has
been compared to "a stack of pancakes in disarray." 34 The dis-
array is a result of the lack of coincidence of the boundaries
and jurisdiction of the various units, which usually cover only a
portion of the same geographical area.3 5
The impact of this "pancake" effect on the metropolitan en-
vironment is indisputable. Fragmented governmental units are
expected to handle isolated problems such as physical blight in
the cities, substandard housing, inadequate urban mass transpor-
tation, education, water and air pollution, and juvenile delin-
quency.38 These problems are all public in nature and impact,
and depend primarily upon government action for solution.
However, the Council of State Governments summed up the
root of the metropolitan problem:
The basis of the problem is the absence of general local [area-
wide] governmental organizations broad enough to cope with
metropolitan matters. There is a lack of area-wide govern-
mental jurisdictions that can effectively provide and finance
services, that can plan and regulate and that are constructed
to facilitate adequate accountability to the metropolitan pub-
lic for their actions. The metropolitan problem thus is in
fact a series of major problems.ST
Moreover, several other problems exist. First, the local units
are not large enough in population, area or taxable resources.
Second, popular control over local governments is ineffective
because of the large number of elected offices and special dis-
tricts, through which political responsibility is diffused. Third,
policy making mechanisms are weak in most local units except
GOVERNMENT 12 (1966). The various layers include (1) The City of
Fridley, (2) 14 Independent School Districts, (3) North Suburban Sani-
tary Sewer District, (4) Minneapolis-St. Paul Sanitary District, (5) North
Suburban Hospital District, (6) Soil Conservation District, (7) Anoka
County, (8) Minneapolis-St. Paul Metropolitan Airport Commission, (9)
Metropolitan Mosquito Control District, (10) The State of Minnesota,
and (11) the United States of America.
It should be noted that the Minnesota State Legislature in the 1967
Session created two more "layers of government" which exercise juris-
diction over Fridley: The Metropolitan Transit Commission, MNN.
STAT. §§ 473.01-473.08 (1967) and the Metropolitan Council, MINN.
STAT. § 473 B. 01- 473 B. 08 (1967).
34. J. BOLLENS, supra note 9, at 151.
35. Id.
36. R. MARTIN, supra note 31, at 14-19. Other problems include
traffic control, land use planning and control, disposal of sewage and
solid waste, open space acquisition, and civil defense. ACIR, ALTERNA-
TV E APPROACHES at 7. See also GOVERNOR'S COMMISSION ON METRO-
POLITAN PROBLEMS, MEETING METROPOLITAN PROBLEMS 9 (Cal. 1960).
37. Cou xci OF STATE GOVERNMENTS, THE STATES AND THE METRO-
POLITAN PROBLEM 17 (1956).
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cities. There is seldom strong executive leadership formulat-
ing plans, subject to review by a representative legislative body.
Fourth, the administrative organization in many local govern-
ments is antiquated. Fifth, many units of local government have
failed to attract qualified personnel, due in part to the spoils
system in some areas, and low pay scales in others.38
From this milieu of dense population, fragmented overlap-
ping, and governmental competition, the question necessarily
arises, "[w]ho can speak for the metropolitan area and its peo-
ple?"3 9  Generally there has been no answer. One solution
often suggested by commentators is the integration of various
governmental units through reorganization of governments in
metropolitan areas.40
III. THE ROLE OF THE STATE AND FEDERAL
GOVERNMENTS
A. THE STATES
Under the tenth amendment to the Constitution, the states
have the authority to regulate local government organization and
power.4 ' Each local government possesses only that authority
granted by state constitutions and statutory action. The Dillon
Rule,42 expounded in 1868, holds that unless otherwise provided
in state constitutions, municipal corporations are solely creatures
of the state. However, the Dillon Rule is often limited by con-
stitutional home rule provisions43 and prohibitions against spe-
cial or local legislation.44 Given these impediments to state
38. COMMITTEE FOR EcONOMIc DEVELOPMTENT, supra note 33, at
11-13.
39. R. WEAVFR, THE URBAN ComELEx: HUMAN VALUES IN URBAN
LIFE 155 (1964).
40. E.g., ACIR, ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES; COMMITTEE FOR ECONOMIC
DEVELOPIVENT, supra note 33; Dixon, New Constitutional Forms for
Metropolis: Reapportioned County Boards; Local Councils of Govern-
ment, 30 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 57 (1965); Grant, Trends in Urban
Government and Administration, 30 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 38 (1965).
41. U.S. CONsT. amend. X:
The powers not delegated to the United States by The Consti-
tution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the
States respectively, or to the people.
42. City of Clinton v. Cedar Rapids & Mo. Riv. R.R., 24 Iowa
455 (1868).
43. See H. McBAiN, THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF MUNICIPAL HOME
RULE (1916). In 1964, 27 states had provisions concerning municipal
home rule. Sandalow, The Limits of Municipal Power Under Home
Rule: A Role For The Courts, 48 MIN. L. REV. 643, 645 (1964).
44. In 1962 all but four states had constitutional provisions gov-
erning special legislation or requiring that all such legislation be gen-
eral. Winter, Classification of Municipalities, 57 Nw. U.L. REV. 279, 280
(1962). See, e.g., Minn. Const. art. 11, § 2; MINN. STAT. § 645.023 (1967).
[Vol. 53:122
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action, it is clear that responsibility for change has rested in
part with the voters.45
In addition to the state authority over local governments
even in lieu of the obstacles mentioned above, there are several
reasons why the states will, and should act to help solve the
metropolitan problem. Hopefully, states will act more respon-
sively to metropolitan crises as their legislative bodies become
apportioned on the one-man-one-vote basis under Baker v. Carr.46
Not only will urban areas look to the states for aid, but the
shift in representation will result in more state attention being
given to the metropolitan areas.47 A chief reason why the states
should act in the metropolitan area is that in most instances the
states' geographical jurisdiction is broad enough to cope with
metropolitan problems.48 Finally, the states have a broad eco-
nomic and tax base and can, through the use of aid programs,
bring its resources to bear on local needs.49 Despite these ad-
vantages enjoyed by the state governments, they have been
slow to respond with needed technical and expert assistance in
the area of finance and planning.5 0 However, it has been recog-
nized that the states play a key role in the solution of metro-
politan area problems. The Council of State Governments
stated that
responsibility for providing a workable pattern of local govern-
ment in metropolitan areas, with variations as circumstances
require, is clearly a state responsibility, all the more so because
the present complex pattern is its handiwork.51
It is generally concluded that the primary responsibility of
the states is to provide a governmental framework for attack-
ing metropolitan problems and the technical assistance neces-
sary to implement solutions.52  Both responsibilities, however,
have been honored in the breach. The states have generally
failed to provide legal authorization for even the mildest re-
forms, or when they have responded to metropolitan area prob-
lems it has been with too little, too late.
53
45. J. BOLLENS, supra note 9, at 529.
46. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
47. Beckman & Ingraham, The States and Urban Problems, 30
LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 76, 78 (1965).
48. CoUNc. OF STATE GOVERNMENTS, STATE RESPONSIiITnY IN
URBAN REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT 18 (1962).
49. B. FRmEDEN, supra note 9, at 118.
50. J. BOLLENS, supra note 9, at 529.
51. COUNCIL OF STATE GOVERNMENTS, supra note 48, at 17.
52. Id.; ACIR, GOVERNNENT STRUCTURE at 19.
53. J. BOLLENS, supra note 9, at 529. R. C. Martin wrote: "The
states have been loath to grapple with urban problems, particularly the
vast and complex problems of a volatile metro-society." R. MARTIN,
1968]
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B. THE FEDERAL GOVERNMET
Ever since the depression, the federal government has played
an increasingly large role in matters which have traditionally
been of local concern. 4 There are two reasons assigned for this
new role. A primary reason for federal government action in
metropolitan areas has been the failure of states to meet the prob-
lems, as discussed above.5 5 Second, the sheer magnitude and
complexity of the problems has led to the conclusion that while
metropolitan problems are of local origin, they are national in
both scope and significance.56 The response of the federal gov-
ernment has been a cash grant-in-aid program.57 However,
while the amount of funds flowing to the cities has increased, a
marked concern has been shown in Washington that the grants
are ineffectual because of poor coordination and that direct na-
tional-local grants tend to disrupt the federal system balance
among local governments, the states, and the national govern-
ment.5
8
Recently the federal government has attempted to pursue a
TnE CImEs AND TH FEDERAL SYSTEM 109. See also T. SANFoRD, STORm
OVER THE STATES 1-39 (1967).
54. R. MARTIN, supra note 53, at 111. See T. HUTCHINSON, METRO-
POLiTAN AREA PROBLEMS: THE ROLE OF THE FEDERAL GOVVERNMENT (1961).
55. R. CONNERY & R. LEACH, THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT AND
METROPOLITAN AREAS 199-209 (1960). The argument has been advanced
that the pattern of direct national-local relations in some areas has
prevented the states from exercising their role in the federal system.
ACIR, GOVERNMENT STRUCTURE at 43. Cf. The statement of Arthur
Naftalin, Mayor of Minneapolis in 1962:
When we turn to the State-and this is true generally over the
country-we find that the states have not been in a position to
be of much help, at least they have not exercised leadership
in the assistance of municipalities .... It is also a question of
inadequate procedure, inadequate structure and inadequate use
of the legislative process, together with a lack of concern
and an archaic political and governmental device.
Hearings on the Role of the Federal Government in Metropolitan Areas
Before the Subcomm. on Intergovernmental Relations of the Senate
Comm. on Government Operations, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 43 (1962).
56. R. MARTIN, CITIEs at 172.
57. The amount of federal aid to state and local governments has
increased dramatically from 7.9 billion dollars in 1962 to an estimated
17.4 billion dollars in 1968. U.S. DEPT. OF COMMERCE, BUREAU OF CEN-
SUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UxITED STATES 420 (1967).
58. See Hearings on Improving Intergovernmental Cooperation
in the Management of Federal Assistance Programs Before the Sub-
comm. on Intergovernmental Relations of the Senate Comm. on Gov-
ernment Operations, 89th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1 (1966) [hereinafter cited
1966 HEARIGs]. But see N. RocKEFELLER, THE FUTURE OF FEDERAL.SM
43-44 (1962).
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policy of "creative federalism."59  The goal of the policy is to
preserve and strengthen state and local government while coor-
dinating all governmental projects aimed at urban problems. 0
The most recent and by far the most significant legislation illus-
trating this policy is the Demonstration Cities and Metropolitan
Development Act of 1966.61 Under this program, applications by
local governmental units within metropolitan areas for federal
funds are required to be reviewed by an area-wide planning
agency for its comments on the extent to which the local project
is consistent with comprehensive metropolitan planning.62 Loans
or grants for facilities which require coordination include open
space,63 hospitals,6 4 airports,65 libraries,66 water supply and dis-
tribution,67 sewerage facilities and waste treatment,6 high-
ways,6 9 mass transit,7 0 water development and land conserva-
tion,71 and various other miscellaneous programs.72 Supplemen-
59. Statement by John Gardiner, former Secretary of Health Edu-
cation and Welfare, 1966 HEANGs at 270-71. See also CoNNERY, supra
note 55, at 220-24.
60. 1966 HEAnmNs at 270.
61. 42 U.S.C. §§ 3301-3374 (Supp. I, 1967).
62. 42 U.S.C. § 3334 (Supp. II, 1967).
63. Greenspan program, 7 U.S.C. § 318-38(i) (j) (Supp.. II, 1967);
outdoor recreation, 16 U.S.C. §§ 4601-460-11 (Supp. II, 1967); landscap-
ing and scenic enhancement, 23 U.S.C. § 319b (Supp. II, 1967); open
space program, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1500-1500e (Supp. II, 1967).
64. Vocational rehabilitation facilities, 29 U.S.C, § 32 (Supp. II,
1967); health facilities construction-multi-county, 40 U.S.C. § 202
(Supp. II, 1967); health research facilities, 42 U.S.C. §§ 292-292 (j), as
amended, (Supp. II, 1967); community mental retardation facilities and
mental health center construction, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2661-2665, 2671-2677,
2691-2696, (1964).
65. Airport planning and construction, 49 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1120 (1964),
as amended, (Supp. II, 1967).
66. 20 U.S.C. §§ 351-58 (1964) (library construction); 42 U.S.C.
8 280b-3 (Supp. II, 1967) (construction of regional medical libraries).
67. 7 U.S.C. § 1926 (a) (Supp. I, 1967)- (rural water facilities);
42 U.S.C. §§ 3101-3108 (Supp. I, 1967) (basic water facilities).
68. 7 U.S.C. § 1926 (a) (Supp. II, 1967) (rural waste disposal); 33
U.S.C. § 466c-1 (Supp. II, 1967) (waste treatment works construction);
40 U.S.C. § 212 App. (Supp. IA 1967) (sewage treatment works); 42
U.S.C. §§ 3101-3108 (Supp. H, 1967) (basic sewer facilities); 42 U.S.C.
8H 3251-3259 (Supp. I, 1967) (solid waste disposal).
69. 40 U.S.C. § 201 App. (Supp. II, 1967) (Appalachian develop-
ment highway system).
70. 49 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1604, 1607-1611 (Supp. II, 1967) (urban mass
transportation).
71. 7 U.S.C. § 608c (1964) (loans for soil and water conservation
and shifts in land use); 16 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1009 (1964), as amended,
(Supp. II, 1967) (watershed protection and flood prevention); 33 U.S.C.
§§ 426-426h (1964) (beach erosion control and flood prevention); 40
U.S.C. § 205 App. (Supp. H, 1967) (mining area restoration); 42 U.S.C.
§§ 1962-1962d-3 (Supp. H, 1967) (state and regional water resources.
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tal incentive grants are available to areas meeting federal stand-
ards for area-wide planning and coordination. 73 In addition to
coordination among units within the metropolitan area, the act
also provides for a metropolitan "expediter" to coordinate the
needs of metropolitan area governments with the federal pro-
grams available.7 4 The policy, therefore, of creative federalism
evidenced by the Demonstration Cities Program, represents rec-
ognition of the need to match problems of national scope with
human and economic resources from the national government.7 5
IV. CURRENT PROPOSALS TO SOLVE THE
METROPOLITAN PROBLEM
A. UNDERLYING VALUES TO BE SERVED
Students of political theory have suggested that four primary
values must be served by any form of governmental reorganiza-
tion: liberty, equality, welfare 7 6 and efficient operation in
rendering governmental services.7 7 In this century, the first
three have been subordinated to the fourth.7 8 In addition to
planning); 43 U.S.C. §§ 421b, 421c, 422a-k (1964), as amended, (Supp.
II, 1954) (irrigation and reclamation).
72. 7 U.S.C. §§ 1010, 1011, 1013(a) (1964), as amended, (Supp. II,
1967) (rural renewal and resource conservation and development); 7
U.S.C. § 1926 (a) (6) (Supp. II, 1967) (sewer and water planning); 40
U.S.C. § 461 (Supp. II, 1967) (urban planning assistance); 40 U.S.C.
§ 462 (1964) (public works planning); 42 U.S.C. §§ 1491-1497 (1964)
(public facility loan program); 42 U.S.C. §§ 3101-3108 (Supp. II, 1967)
(advance acquisition of land); 42 U.S.C. §§ 3131-3136, 3141-3143 (Supp.
II, 1967) (public works and development facilities loans and grants);
42 U.S.C. §§ 3151-3152 (Supp. II, 1967) (planning assistance); 42 U.S.C.
§§ 3181-3189 (Supp. II, 1967) (regional action planning).
73. 42 U.S.C. § 3335 (Supp. II, 1967).
74. Id. § 3333.
75. R. MARTiN, CrmEs at 172.
76. Ylvisaker, Some Criteria for a "Proper" Areal Division of Gov-
ernmental Powers, in AREA AND PowER 27 (A. Maass, ed. 1959). The
author views the implementation of these values in a political system as
giving assurance of protection to individuals against arbitrary or hasty
government action. Thus, liberty is reflected in the system through the
provision of points of popular access, pressure, and control; and by pro-
viding access to governmental power by minorities. Equality is realized
to the extent the system affords a barrier to concentration of social,
economic, and political power. Equality is maximized in a positive
sense through provision of opportunities for participation in the develop-
ment of both individual and public policy. The value of welfare is re-
flected to the extent the system assures that the needs of individuals
will be recognized and met. Id. at 30-34.
77. Wood, A Division of Powers in Metropolitan Areas, in AREA ANo
PowER 53, 57-60 (A. Maass ed. 1959).
78. Id.
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these values, the traditional ideological controversy between lo-
calism and centralism 79 is ever present in any political struggle
to reorganize metropolitan government.80 These issues manifest
themselves in disputes regarding the degree to which local au-
tonomy shall be surrendered to regional determination, and the
extent of local control to be sacrificed to a larger, and perhaps
more efficient governmental unit.
Several sets of criteria have been suggested for use in
evaluating local government structure and reorganization.8 1 The
Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations suggests
the following eight.8 2  (1) The jurisdiction of the local govern-
ment should be broad enough to "cope adequately" with the
forces creating metropolitan problems. Coping adequately is
explained to mean effective planning throughout the entire area,
effective decision making designed to foster debate among a full
range of diverse interest groups or factions, and effective exe-
cution of public decisions. (2) The base of local government
should be broad enough to be able to raise adequate revenue in
an equitable manner. (3) There should be flexibility to alter
boundaries to adjust to future growth. (4) Local govern-
ments should be general-purpose "rather than single-purpose" to
ensure a better balancing between needs and resources, and to
coordinate governmental service functions efficiently.8 3 (5) The
79. Reiss, The Community and the Corporate Area, 105 U. PA.
L. REV. 443, 459 (1957). See LOcALISM, REGIONALISM, AND CENTRALI-
zATNio n Co1mNiTy LIFE AND SOCIAL POLICY: SELECTED PAPERS BY
Louis WIrTH 143-58 (E. Marvick & A. Reiss, ed. 1956); L. GuLIcK, THE
METROPOLITAN PROBLEM AND AMERICAN IDEAS (1962). For a historical dis-
cussion of values see Huntington, The Founding Fathers and the Divi-
sion of Powers, in AREA Am PowER 150 (A. Maass, ed. 1959). See also
THE FEDERALIST No. 10, 53-62 (N.Y. Mod. Library 1941).
80. Government reorganization in metropolitan areas may meet
with the opposition of those people whose vested interests or positions
would be in jeopardy if a new scheme were adopted. Moak, Some
Practical Obstacles in Modifying Governmental Structure to Meet
Metropolitan Problems, 105 U. PA. L. REV. 603, 612-13 (1957). One
political observer noted:
There is nothing more difficult to take in hand, more peril-
ous to conduct, or more uncertain in its success, than to take
the lead in the introduction of a new order of things. Because
the innovator has for enemies all those who have done well
under the old conditions, and lukewarm defenders who may
do well under the new.
N. MIACm-vELrm THE PRINCE 29 (Everyman's ed. 1958).
81. ACIR, ALTERNATIvE APPROACHES at 11-17: Jones, Attempts to
Meet The Problems, in THE FUTuRE OF CITIES AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT
527-29 (C. Woodbury, ed. 1953); Ylvisaker, supra note 76, at 34-41.
82. ACIR, ALTERNATiVE APPROACHES at 11-17.
83. Ylvisaker, supra note 76, at 35-36 states that he does not mean
by the assignment of general power to exclude special districts or
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jurisdiction should be broad enough to allow the unit to take ad-
vantage of the "economies of scale," that is, the relationship of ef-
ficiency between the size of a government unit and its costs of
providing services and performing functions.84 (6) The local unit
should be "accessible to, and controllable by the people." This
criterion relates to the structural and procedural aspects of the
unit such as the number of elected officials, the method of their
selection, 85 and provisions for receiving and acting on complaints.
(7) The local government should foster active citizen participa-
tion. (8) The final criterion suggested by the Commission is
political feasibility. This involves the potential for acceptance
which any proposal has. It depends on factors such as the dispo-
sition of the present local governments toward change, the atti-
tude of persons with authority to act (the state legislature or
electorate), and the status of the constitutional or statutory au-
thority with regard to change.
B. CURRENT APPROACHES
Modification of governmental structure in metropolitan
areas as a means of adapting to the needs and pressures of ur-
banization has received wide attention by scholars. 8 Many em-
ploy different schemes of classification yet most employ similar
basic concepts.8 7 The following classification, with one excep-
tion, is the system used by the Advisory Commission on Inter-
governmental Relations. It proceeds according to the impact
which the approach has on existing government structure, from
authorities designed to carry out particular functions. Rather he states
that a broader grant of general power may well make it unnecessary
to have so many special districts. He implies that this arrangement will
keep the special districts directly responsible to a government of general
power while restricting the powers of the district.
84. See ACIR, PERFORMANCE OF URBAN FUNcTIONs: LOCAL AND
AREA WIDE 45-50 (1963).
85. Ylvisaker, supra note 76, at 39 states as his fourth criteria:
"The components should not as such be represented in the legislatures
of the higher levels." This maxim has particular significance for the
organization of a metropolitan area government. In both the council of
governments approach and the federation approach, stymie and paro-
chialism are likely to impede the success of the metropolitan arrange-
ment, since representatives at the metropolitan level represent their
governments instead of constituencies apportioned according to popu-
lation.
86. See, e.g., C. ADnIAx, GOVERNiNG URBAN AavmRiCA 276 (1961);
Jones, Local Government Organization In Metropolitan Areas, in THE
FuTuRE OF THE CITIEs AND URBAN DEVELOPMVENT (C. Woodbury, ed. 1953);
Cou cIL or STATE GoVERNMENTS, THE STATES Am THE METEOPOLITAN
PROBLEM (1956).
87. R. MARTm, METROPOLIS IN TRANSITIoN 3, table 1 (1963).
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mildest to strongest. An addition is the initial inclusion .of a
metropolitan planning agency, which in some cases may have
only an informal effect in creating a metropolitan area-wide
outlook.
1. Regional Planning Commissions
These commissions are usually composed of a professional
staff and controlled by public officials. They are charged with
creating "comprehensive master plans"88 and coordinating local
efforts towards solution of metropolitan problems. Powerless
and frequently not inclusive of all affected jurisdictions within
the metropolitan areas,89 the only positive achievement of such
bodies has usually been the creation of some sense of metro-
politan-mindedness.
2. Extraterritorial Powers
Here, municipalities are given powers beyond their bound-
aries to provide services for their citizens, and in some cases,
to regulate the unincorporated fringe area beyond the bound-
ary through zoning and subdivision control.9 0
3. Intergovernmental Agreements: Joint Exercise of Powers
and Intergovernmental Sales of Services9'
These agreements may be authorized by special or general
law."' They may provide for sharing of the costs of a function,93
or one local unit may provide it for another.94
88. Note, The Regional Approach to Planning, 50 IowA L. REV. 582,
593 (1965). See Haar, The Master Plan; An Impermanent Constitution,
20 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 353 (1955).
89. Haar, Regionalism and Realism in Land Use Planning, 105
U. PA. L. REV. 515 (1957); Note, supra note 88, at 597.
90. See R. MADDOX, ExTRATERnoRALx PoWERs OF MUIciPALITIES IN
THE UNn=D STATES (1955); F. SENGSTOCK, ExTRATERRITORTAL POWERS
IN THE METROPOLITAN AREA (1962); Anderson, The Extraterritorial
Power of Cities, 10 MINN. L. REV. 475 (1926).
91. See COUNCIL OF STATE GOVERNmENTS, THE STATES AND THE
METROPOLITAN PROBLEM 105 (1956); R. WARREN, GOVERNMENT IN
METROPOLITAN REGIONS: A REAPPRAISAL OF FRACTIONATED PoLITIcAL OR-
GANIZATION (1966).
92. E.g., Alum. STAT. § 471.59 (1967).
93. See notes 134-36 infra, and accompanying text for a discussion
of the Joint Powers program in Minnesota.
94. An extreme example is Lakewood, California, which upon be-
coming a city contracted to have almost all governmental services pro-
vided by Los Angeles County. See S. GovE, THE LAxEWOOD PLAN(1961).
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4. Voluntary Metropolitan Councils
These are voluntary associations of elected public officials
of governments in the metropolitan area, often referred to as the
"council of government" approach, and are discussed below 5
5. The Urban County
This involves a reorganization in which a county shifts
from its traditional position as an administrative arm of the
state to a position of providing a significant number of services of
a traditionally municipal character throughout the entire juris-
dictionP6
6. Transfer of Functions to the State Government
This generally involves performance of functions which ex-
tend beyond the boundaries of the metropolitan area by an
executive agency of the state.97
7. Metropolitan Special Districts, Limited Purpose and Multiple
Purpose
Special districts are independent units of government or-
ganized to perform one (limited) or more (multiple) services in
the urban area.8
8. Annexation and Consolidation
The former generally refers to absorbtion of territory by a
city, with the structure of government unchanged. The latter,
however, generally refers to the merger of two units of govern-
ment to form a new unit.90
95. See note 106 infra, and accompanying text.
96. J. BOLLENS & H. SCHmANDT, THE METROPOLIS 439 (1965); Cross-
man, Counties Come to Life, 53 NAT. Civ. REV. 429 (1964); Note, Urban
County: A Study of New Approaches to Local Government in Metro-
politan Areas, 73 HARv. L. REV. 526 (1960).
97. See, e.g., HOUSE COMM. ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS, GOVERN-
MENT IN METROPOLITAN AREAS, COMMENTARIES ON REPORT BY THE AD-
VISORY COMvISSION ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, 87th Cong., 1st
Sess. 65-71 (Comm. Print 1962); Four Governors Approve Delaware
River Compact, 50 NAT. CIV. REV. 143 (1961).
98. ACIR, THE PROBLEM OF SPEciAL DISTRICTS IN AMERICAN GOVERN-
MENT (1964); J. BOLLENS, SPECIAL DISTRICT GOVRNMENTS nT THE
UNiTED STATES (1957); M. PocK, INDEPENDENT SPECIAL DISTRICTS: A
SOLUTION TO THE METROPOLITAN AREA PaOBLEMS (1962); R. SMnzTH, PUB-
LIc AUTHORITIES, SPECIAL DISTRICTS AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT (1964).
99. See F. SENGSTOcK, ANNExATIoN: A SOLUTION TO THE METRO-
POLITAN AREA PROBLEMS (1960); F. SENIGSTOCK, CONSOLMATION: BUILD-
ING A BRIDGE BETWEEN CITY Am SUBURB (1964). See also, R. DixoN,
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9. City-County Separation
This approach is an action whereby a central city separates
from the county and then exercises both municipal and county
functions within its boundaries. 10 0
10. City-County Consolidation
This represents the complete or partial merger of a county
and cities within it into a single government.1 1
11. Federation
This involves the division of functions between two levels
or tiers of government according to whether they are local or
area-wide. 0 2
The schemes most frequently used to solve functional prob-
lems in the metropolitan area include intergovernmental service
agreements and special districts. Annexation and consolidation
have wide-spread use for reorganization of general purpose units.
However, it should be noted that these approaches to govern-
ment reorganization are not mutually exclusive; some are sup-
portive of others. In addition, they do not envision an elaborate
shift to a new supergovernment while jettisoning the old struc-
tures. From the point of view of political feasibility this seems
necessary. Yet at least one commentator feels there is a com-
pelling need to "constitutionalize" metropolitan government so
that the metropolitan citizen can "acquire a direct voter rela-
tionship between himself and a set of officials performing at
least a goodly number of metropolitan functions."'10 3
The most widely accepted approach in recent years has been
the council of government system.10 4 These councils are largely
JR. & J. KERSTETTER, ADJUSTING MUNICIPAL BOUNDARIES: THE LAW
AND PRACTICE IN FOURTY-EIGHT STATES (1959).
100. P. STUDENsI, THE GOVERNMENT OF METROPOLITAN AREAS IN
THE UNITED STATES 170 (1930).
101. CouNcn OF STATE GoVERNwENTS, TuE STATES AND THE METRO-
POLITAN PROBLEM 53 (1956).
102. See P. STUDENSKI, supra note 100, at 386; J. BOLLENS, supra
note 96, at 439; GRUmm, METROPOLITAN AREA GOVERNMENT: THE TORONTO
EXPERIENCE (1959); H. KAPLAN, URBAN POLITICAL SYSTEMS (1967).
103. Dixon, New Constitutional Forms for Metropolis: Reappor-
tioned County Boards; Local Councils of Governments, 30 LAw &
CONTEMP. PROB. 57, 64 (1965).
104. See J. BOLLENS, supra note 96, ch. 13; COUNCIL OF STATE Gov-
ERNMENTS, STATE RESPONSIBILITY IN URBAN REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT 88
(1962); Humes, Washington Area Reports Progress, 50 NAT. CIV. REV. 550
(1961); Jones, Cooperation Pattern, 51 NAT. CIV. REV. 302 (1962); Leach,
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composed of elected officials in the metropolitan area, and are
therefore built upon the existing political structures. Since they
are entirely voluntary, they are not dependent upon special legis-
lation or voter approval. They may, however, have legal status
under joint powers legislation.10 5
Councils have proven to be a social and political forum where
local officials can meet together on common concerns. The re-
sulting amelioration of interlocal suspicions and hostilities has
been said to be one of the most significant achievements of this
approach. 106 Two devices utilized to encourage communication
include, first, the institutionalized practice of receiving and hear-
ing reports from other regional agencies such as planning com-
missions or study groups. However, debate or action seldom
follows these hearings and the process remains essentially a
communications device. A second device used by the councils is
the establishment of standing committees on functional problems.
Often this may lead to the provision of cooperative services to
council members. Such services include data collection, joint
studies, police information, and joint purchasing.10 7
Councils of governments are not without problems associ-
ated with fragmented government in metropolitan areas. Many
problems stem from the youth of this type of approach, while
others are inherent in the structure and nature of the organiza-
tion. A paramount difficulty with the council of government ap-
proach is the method of representation. Since each unit has
equal representation, those units representing more populous
areas, such as the central cities, are reluctant to see the council
develop into an effective force in regional affairs105 Secondly,
representation is a problem on the executive committees, which
are in most cases the groups which conduct the business of the
council. Where both the central city and counties are repre-
sented on the executive committee, competition may develop
New Urban Challenge, 50 NAT. Civ. Rav. 480 (1961).
As of 1966 there were at least eight councils of governments: (1)
Association of Bay Area Governments-San Francisco; (2) Southern
California Association of Governments-Los Angeles; (3) Mid Willamett
Valley Council of Governments--Salem, Oregon; (4) Puget Sound Gov-
ernmental Conference-Seattle; (5) Supervisors Intercounty Committee
-Detroit; (6) Regional Council of Elected Officials-Philadelphia;
(7) Metropolitan Atlanta Council of Local Governments-Atlanta; (8)
Metropolitan Washington Council of Governments-Washington, D.C.
R. HANSON, METROPOLITAN Cou cius OF GOVERMEuNTS iii-iv (1966).
105. E.g., CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 6500-6513, as amended, (1963).
106. R. HANsoN, supra note 104, at 6.
107. Id. at 8.
108. Id. at 14.
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among jurisdictions within a county for municipal representa-
tion on the committee.1 9 A third problem arises out of the
fact that the council is composed of elected officials of constitu-
ent governments. While this is a strength of the organization in
terms of promoting interlocal cooperation, it becomes a weakness
if effective council members are defeated in local elections on
local rather than metropolitan issues.110
The size and organization of the councils also limits their
effectiveness. Because they attempt to encompass all gov-
ernmental units in the area, the council may have as many as
ninety governments represented."1 Consequently the entire
membership meets infrequently-usually once or twice a year.
The division of the group into special committees further reduces
the exposure of the officials to common problems and solutions.
Moreover, this arrangement tends to result in low political and
public visibility, rather than wide publicity of area-wide prob-
lems and proposals.112 Finally, the tacit or formal requirements
for consensus, or unity in voting magnifies the power of local
interests.11 3 Thus, the recalcitrance of one unit may cause a
delay past the critical moment for decision, or block a decision
altogether." 4
The councils themselves often impose strict limitations on
the types of projects with which they deal. One recent study
made the following four conclusions." 5  First, the councils are
more likely to be successful when the participating govern-
ments agree on both the scope and definition of the problem, and
it tends to be noncontroversial. Second, the solution should not
impair the reputation of any member government. Third, the
prospects for success are greater when the solution is self-execut-
ing, requiring no positive action on the part of member govern-
ments for implementation. Finally, any proposed action is more
likely to meet with the council favor if it costs member units
little or nothing.
It should be remembered, however, that this form of cooper-
ation is relatively new. While they suffer from many inade-
109. Id. at 18.
110. Dixon, supra note 103, at 70.
111. E.g., The Association of Bay Area Governments in the San
Francisco Area has eighty-six members; the Southern California Associ-
ation of Governments in the Los Angeles Area has ninety. R. HANSON,
supra note 104, at 17.
112. Id. at 34.
113. ACIR, ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES at 38.
114. R. HANsoN, supra note 104, at 14.
115. R. MARTn, IETRopo S in TiRiwONsio 48-50 (1963).
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quacies, their gains have been significant. With increasingly
large amounts of federal grants flowing to and through councils
of governments to metropolitan areas, their status and stability
will become established. The most recent survey of councils of
governments concluded:
They have proved their worth, and offer much knowledge from
which other areas may benefit. The future of this form of
metropolitan cooperation and action seems bright. The coun-
cils of governments offer one of the most productive means of
translating plans into action for many of America's metropoli-
tan areas." 6
V. THE MINNESOTA METROPOLITAN COUNCIL
A. BACKGROUND
In Minnesota the central cities of Minneapolis and St. Paul
plus a five-county suburban area constitute a Bureau of the
Census SMSA which includes at least 261 government units,"7
a present population of 1.7 million, a projected population by
1980 of 2.5 million,118 and a land area in which urban develop-
ment is expected to triple to over 900 square miles by the end of
this century." 9 The central cities are losing people and com-
mercial and industrial firms to the suburbs.
Recent studies by the Citizen's League of Minneapolis and
Hennepin County revealed major problems with sewage dis-
posal, mass transit facilities, multiple governmental units with
inadequate financial resources, large areas with declining hous-
ing in need of rehabilitation, inequalities in assessing valuation
of property within and among municipalities, deficiencies in
fire defense, police protection, traffic congestion, inadequate pro-
visions for preservation of open spaces and for public parks
and playgrounds, and chaotic zoning and planning, with intense
competition for industry.' 20 An additional series of problems in-
116. R. HANSON, supra note 104, at 34-35. See Jones, supra note 104,
at 308: "I view voluntary metropolitan associations of local govern-
ments, however, as the most promising development in our Federal
system. .. ."
117. 1 UNITED STATES BUREAu or CENSUS, CENsus or GOVERNMENTS,
GOVERNMENT ORGANIZATION 306 (1962).
118. JOINT PROGRAM FOR LAND-UsE TRANSPORTATION PLANNING IN
THE TwIN CITIES METROPOLITAN AREA, REPORT NUMBER Two: 4,000,000
by 2,000, 4 (1964).
119. Id. at 5.
120. Citizens League of Minneapolis and Hennepin County, The
Metropolitan Pattern: Municipal Governments In the Twin Cities (Min-
nesota) Area (1961) (mimeo on file with the University of Minnesota
Law Library).
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cludes highway planning in the metropolitan area, airport plan-
ning, mosquito control, and air pollution. 12 1  The Twin Cities
metropolitan area therefore has been confronted with the char-
acteristic problems of metropolitan areas generally: the spill-
over effect resulting from policies of "municipal mercantilism"
which often ignore the interests of the entire region; the pancake
phenomenon of fragmented and overlapping layers of govern-
ment; and the lack of adequate governmental machinery to deal
with area-wide service problems.
As early as 1925 attempts at an area-wide approach to these
problems were undertaken.122 In 1933 and 1943 respectively the
Minnesota Legislature created two special service districts which
are still operational: a sanitary district 23 and an airport com-
mission. 124  In 1957 the legislature established a Metropolitan
Planning Commission,225 the immediate predecessor of the new
Metropolitan Council. One of the significant features of the
Planning Commission statute was the provision for an area-
wide tax levy so that the commission might support itself.2 0
While the original jurisdiction of the commission was the five
counties contiguous to the Twin Cities area, by 1959 Carver and
Scott Counties had joined, making the area included the same
as that included in the planning effort 30 years earlier, and ulti-
mately in the present Metropolitan Council. 27
The Metropolitan Planning Commission was charged with
responsibility in four areas. It was to (1) plan for the physical,
social, and economic development of the metropolitan area; (2)
conduct research; (3) advise and assist the legislature and con-
stituent units on planning matters; and (4) act as a coordinating
agency for activities effecting metropolitan area planning. 28
Significantly, the agency was purely advisory.1 29 It was given
121. CiTzEN's LEAGUE, REPORT, A METROPOLITAN COUNCIL FOR THE
Twin Crns AREA 16-35 (1967).
122. R. MARTiN, supra note 115.
123. MiJn. STAT. §§ 445.01-445.21 (1967).
124. Id. §§ 360.101-360.144.
125. Id. §§ 473.01-473.11.
126. Id. § 473.08.
127. Compare R. MARTIN, supra note 115, at 52 with An. STAT.
§ 473 B.02 (1) (1967).
128. TIN. STAT. § 473.05 (1967).
129. Before a governmental unit in the Metropolitan area makes
a final decision on any matter which, in the sole discretion of
its governing body, is not predominantly local but has a sub-
stantial effect on regional development, the tentative proposal
or plans shall be presented to the commission for its recom-
mendation, and the governing body shall take no binding action
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no formal sanctions by which to implement its plans; implemen-
tation of recommendations to local units depended upon the
voluntary acceptance by the participating governmental units.
There is little evidence that before 1965 the Commission had
gained any amount of "political acceptance" by the constituent
units, °30 and there is no record that any government unit sub-
mitted any project having a "substantial effect on regional de-
velopment" for the Commission's recommendation as authorized
by law. 31 As a result, a large portion of the time and talents of
staff and Commission members was spent in intergovernmental
and educational activities. In 1961 the Commission organized the
Community Affairs Division which served as a liason to the
public and the legislature in matters of metropolitan interest.1 32
It was in the capacity of research, planning, and community
relations that the Commission made the most positive impact. 3
One other metropolitan area-wide approach to current and
anticipated problems is evidenced by the "Joint Program." The
Joint Program was an intergovernmental cooperative effort which
was formed as a response to the 1962 amendment to the highway
act.13 4 This amendment imposed, as a condition to receiving cer-
tain highway aid, the requirement that any project be consistent
with a "comprehensive transportation planning process carried
on cooperatively by State and local communities." Also, it was
financed in part under the Urban Planning Assistance Pro-
on the matter thereafter until the Commission has made its
recommendations or until 30 days have elapsed from the time
of submission to the commission .... Failure to present the
proposal or plans to the Commission shall be a finding by the
governing body that the matter is predominantly local. The
recommendations of the Commission shall be advisory only.
MINN. STAT. § 473.06(6) (1967).
130. R. MARTIN, supra note 115, at 61. See also the Annual Reports
of Metropolitan Planning Commission.
131. It should be noted, however, that the Metropolitan Planning
Commission held public hearings and submitted recommendations on
four disputes between area municipalities and the Minnesota Highway
Department concerning interstate freeway design. TwiN CITIEs METO-
POLITAN PANNING COMMISSION, 1965-1966 BmnETAL REPORT TO THE
MINNESOTA LEGISLATURE 10 (1966).
132. TwIN CITIES METROPOLITAN PLNNING COMIIsSION, .ANNUAL
REPORT 1961, 6-9 (1962).
133. R. MARTIN, supra note 115, at 61. The Commission published
a number of detailed studies on Metropolitan area-wide problems:
GUIDE TO SUBDIVISION CONTROL (1960); METROPOLITAN LAND STUDY (1960);
METROPOLITAN WATER STUDY (1960); METROPOLITAN EcONOIvnc STUDY
(1960); METROPOLITAN POPULATION STUDY (1961); STREET AND HIGHWAY
STANDARDS (1961); METROPOLITAN PARKS (1961); SHOPPING FAcITIEs
IN TH TCMA (1964); COUNTY PLANNING GUIDE (1965).
134. 76 Stat. 1148 (1962), 23 U.S.C. § 134 (1964).
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gram. 35  The Joint Program included local representatives
of the Minnesota Highway Department, the Metropolitan Plan-
ning Commission, the engineering and planning departments of
Minneapolis and St. Paul, and the highway departments in the
seven county area. The basic objective of the Program was to
encourage development decisions that will enhance the "livabil-
ity" and "efficiency" of the metropolitan environment. The ba-
sic product of the Program was a "Comprehensive Metropoli-
tan Plan. . . which will integrate transportation systems and the
urban activities they serve."'13
B. ORIGnT OF Tm METROPOLITAN CouNcIL
Initial backers of a more powerful metropolitan-wide unit of
government were stimulated by two forces. First, the Metro-
politan Planning Commission was becoming the conduit in the
area through which applications for several federal aid programs
had to be referred. The volume of federal applications prom-
ised to increase greatly after Congress passed the Demonstration
Cities and Metropolitan Development Program.137 It was be-
lieved by some that the Metropolitan Planning Commission was
not intended to make policy on this level, but was rather in-
tended to be a purely advisory planning body.138 A second force
was the widespread belief that the existing fragmented struc-
ture of government in the metropolitan area was incapable of
handling service problems which extended across jurisdictional
boundaries. 39 Similarly, there was expressed a need to coordi-
nate the operations and development of existing special service
districts within the area. Thus, the Metropolitan Council was
created, replacing the Metropolitan Planning Commission, in
"order to coordinate the planning and development of the metro-
politan area."'140
135. 40 U.S.C. § 461 (g), as amended, (Supp. 11, 1967) provides up to
two-thirds of the estimated cost of studies, plans and programs under-
taken in seeking a solution to regional problems.
136. JOINT PROGRAM FOR LAND USE-TRANPORTATION PLANNING IN
THE TWIN CITIES METROPOLITAN AREA, MEETING THE CHALLENGE OF MET-
ROPOLITAN GROWTH, REPORT NUMBER ONE at i (1963). The plan has re-
cently been completed. It poses the question to the Metropolitan Coun-
cil, also charged with preparing a development guide, how much of the
Joint Program Plan should be accepted?
137. 42 U.S.C. §§ 3301-3374 (Supp. II, 1967).
138. CITIZENs LEAGUE, SUMMARY OF CONTENTS AND PROPOSALS ON
AREAWVIDE GOVERNMENTAL PROBLEMS OF THE TWIN CITIES METROPOLITAN
AREA 10 (1966); CITIzENS LEAGUE, REPORT; A METROPOLITAN COUNCIL FOR
THE TwIN CITIES AREA (1967).
139. See CITIZENS LEAGUE, supra note 121.
140. MINN. STAT. § 473B.01 (1967).
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The Council was established by two statutes. The first en-
acted the escape clause in the state constitutional amendment
prohibiting special laws without the consent of the affected lo-
calities,141 and the second established the council.142  Conse-
quently the issue did not involve a general referendum in the
Twin Cities area, but circumvented the problem of voter ap-
proval which has proven fatal to plans for reorganization in other
areas. 43 In this context it is interesting to consider the Council
in regard to the ideological dilemma of localism versus central-
ism. If it may be inferred from the fact that various groups rep-
resenting municipalities in the Twin Cities area favored an
elected operating council 44 and that most of the municipalities
themselves favored the same, then it appears that it was the
state government and not local units that feared a "supergov-
eminent." Similarly, the Council is oriented toward and respon-
sible to the legislature, not local voters, and is therefore a more
centralized unit than some advocates originally envisioned. 145
141. Article 11, § 2 of the Minnesota Constitution provides:
The Legislature may enact special laws relating to local govern-
ment units, but a special law, unless otherwise provided by
general law, shall become effective only after its approval by
the affected unit expressed through the voters or governing
body and by such majority as the legislature may direct (em-
phasis added).
The 1967 Legislature enacted by general law the escape clause con-
tained in the Constitution. Mmx. STAr. § 645.023 (1967).
142. MINN. STAT. §§ 473.01-.07 (1967).
143. See ACIR, FACTORS AFFEcTING VOTER REACTION TO GOVERNMEN-
TAL REORGANIZATION IN METROPOLITAN AREAS (1963).
144. The Hennepin and Ramsey County League of Municipalities,
and the Metropolitan section of the Minnesota League of Municipalities
advocated a strong council. Mpls. Tribune, February 17, 1967, at 24,
col. 8.
145. Minnesota does not publish bills which fail to reach the second
reading. The following account is produced from newspaper accounts
and the Citizens League file of typewritten bills. There were two basic
bills introduced. The Ogdahl-Frenzel Bill (Senate File Number 500)
envisioned an elected, operating council with comprehensive affirmative
powers and a plan by which special districts would be added to the
jurisdiction of the Council one at a time.
The Rosenmier, Newcome, Ashback Bill (House File Number
1508), which was adopted after several amendments, entailed a non-
operating appointed body to coordinate long range plans in the metro-
politan area. The council was to be essentially an "arm of the state
government" and not a "supergovernment." Mpls. Tribune, February
24, 1967, at 9, col. 6-7.
It is significant to note that both proposals contemplated merging
the Twin Cities Metropolitan Planning Commission with the new unit.
The Commission itself urged this result in the event the legislature
acted to create a new agency. However, if the legislature did not act,
the Commission proposed a reduction of its own membership from
thirty to fifteen members, in order to strengthen its operations. Twin
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C. STRUCTURE AND ORGANIZATION OF THE METROPOLITAN COUNCIL
The Metropolitan Council exercises jurisdiction over the
seven county area immediately surrounding the Twin Cities
area. It is composed of fifteen members appointed by the gov-
ernor.146 Council districts were created by combining state
senatorial districts, which are apportioned by population. The
governor is to consult with all members of the legislature from
the area composing the council district from which the member is
to be appointed. Furthermore, the appointments are subject to
the advice and consent of the state senate. Each council mem-
ber is to be a resident of the council district which he repre-
sents. 147
1. The Representation Scheme
Although the Council is appointed, it is apportioned on
the basis of population, rather than according to the principle of
constituent-unit representation where governmental units, not
people, are represented in a larger decision making body. For
example, the principle of constituent-unit representation is used
in the federated metropolitan government approach, and in the
councils of local governments approach. Similarly, the principle
is followed with metropolitan special purpose districts primarily
to avoid overburdening the electorate with lengthy ballots, and
secondly, to link the districts to the cities and counties they over-
Cities Metropolitan Planning Commission, Newsletter, Vol. VI, No. 6,
January 1967.
The Citizens League advocated a 29-31 member council with each
council member representing a state senatorial district within the
metropolitan area. Citizens League, Report, supra note 121, at 8. The
Ogdahl proposal also followed this approach.
146. MINW. STAT. § 473B.02 (3) (1967). The issue of whether the
council members should be elected or appointed was fiercely debated.
The Metropolitan Planning Commission, the Citizens League, the Henne-
pin and Ramsey County League of Municipalities, and the Metropolitan
Section of the League of Municipalities all favored the Ogdah proposal
of an area-wide, multi-purpose directly elected council to operate in
certain areas such as mass transit, sewage, and planning. Mpls. Tribune,
February 17, 1967 at 24, col. 8. An amendment to the Rosenmier Bill
was proposed in the Senate which would have made the Metropolitan
Council elective in 1971. The amendment failed in a 33-33 vote. Mpls.
Tribune, May 20, 1967, at 1, cols. 1-2. A similar amendment failed in
the House by a vote 66-62. Mpls. Tribune, May 16, 1967 at 1, cols. 5-8.
147. MnmN. STAT. § 473B.02 (1967). The original Rosenmier proposal
provided for council members to be appointed at large from the metro-
politan area, whereas the Ogdahl bill provided for state senatorial dis-
tricts as the areal basis for representation.
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lie.1 48  The obvious problems which arise from representation
by government-unit concern the population differences among
the different units represented. In a council of governments, for
example, a vote by the mayor of a lightly populated suburb may
be equal to the vote of the mayor of the central city. A second
problem arises from the parochialism which results from local
officials on one tier of decision making representing that unit
in another tier. 49 Since the official is elected by the city, for
example, he would be unlikely to register a vote adverse to the
city's interest.
The Minnesota scheme in providing representation on a basis
apportioned according to population, rather than by representa-
tion of local government units, enables the Council to reflect
metropolitan interests better. Decisions by council members are
likely to be unfettered by any dampening effect which the deci-
sion might have on a unit of government within their constitu-
ency. In addition, citizens of each district are provided with a
more accessible structure through which to influence area-wide
decisions. A disgruntled citizen need only contact one repre-
sentative to voice an opinion, instead of facing the gamut of
multiple overlapping jurisdictions.
While this scheme of representation may facilitate access to
decision making, the method of selection affords far less citizen
control than under a council of governments approach. For ex-
ample, a disapproving citizen under an area-wide council of
governments may express disapproval at the polls in local elec-
tions. However, a resident of the Twin Cities area may only
exert indirect pressure on the Council. His control is only
operative through his state representative, state senator, and the
governor. In effect, political accountability is centered in the
state government, not at the regional level.
The statutory scheme fails to accomplish certain gains
possible under the council of governments approach. For ex-
ample, since council members are not locally elected officials,
148. J. BOLLENS & H. ScHMANDT, THE METROPOLIS 445 (1965). The
Metropolitan Planning Commission was an excellent example of con-
stituent-unit representation. The cities of Minneapolis and St. Paul each
had two representatives; there were seven representatives of suburban
municipalities, one from each of seven counties, two representatives of
townships, one of school districts, one appointed by the Metropolitan
Airports Commission, one appointed by the Minneapolis-St. Paul Sani-
tary District, and seven members appointed by the governor, of whom
four must have resided in the central city. MINN. STAT. § 473.03
(1967).
149. See generally H. KAPLAN, URBAN POLITICAL SYSTEMS (1967).
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there may not be the desirable increase of intergovernmental
communication and understanding. Indeed, the present system
may tend to foster conflict between local governments and the
council. The answer to this argument depends on future actions
of the council and the extent to which it is able to coordinate lo-
cal policies. Similarly, it may be argued that council members
under the present scheme will not be closely linked to the exist-
ing local political power structure, as locally elected officials
would be. That council members may not have a broad local po-
litical base may prove advantageous when faced with a decision
which may be politically distasteful to governments in their re-
spective districts. Thus, while the present form of representation
may sacrifice intergovernmental good will, and does not provide
for a broad base of local political power, it allows council mem-
bers greater freedom and independence to represent metropolitan
interests.
2. Improving the Method of Council Member Selection
Several arguments may be advanced favoring an appointive
council as presently authorized, rather than elective council, par-
ticularly in the early years of its existence. They are based on
the premise that the council is primarily a coordinating admin-
istrative body, not a policy making body with operating powers
over a number of area-wide functions. First, there is an ex-
pressed need for capable men on the Council. Business leaders,
it is argued, would accept the appointment of the governor but
would not seek the office if positions were elective. Second, the
appointment process is intended to preserve control of the
Metropolitan Council in the legislature. The alternative, it is
feared, is that the Council may eclipse the legislature in status
and stature within the state.150 Third, there is a concern that
if the Council were made initially elective, the decision would be
irrevocable. 15 This is based on the legitimate observation that
governments, once established, develop inertia as well as vested
interests and consequently are adverse to change. 152 A final ar-
gument in favor of appointed officials in the early life of the
Council is that it represents a new organization, and from the
point of view of practical politics, should evolve slowly and care-
fully, removed from the political arena.
There are two strong arguments in favor of an elected coun-
150. Mpls. Tribune, March 25, 1967 at 7, col. 3.
151. Mps. Tribune, May 6, 1967 at 16, cols. 1-S.
152. See note 80, supra.
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cil, however. The classic criticisms of special districts is that
they lack political responsiveness to citizens153 and remain as
hidden layers of government. 54 Thus, an appointed board only
adds to the voter confusion produced by fragmented govern-
ment, whereas an elected council with wide publicity would have
much greater public visibility. Similarly, an elected council
over which the citizenry exercised control would be more po-
litically responsive than an appointive body. Finally, if the Coun-
cil were charged with the operation of specified metropolitan
service districts, instead of allowing these agencies to remain
accountable only to the legislature, voter confusion would be
diminished. Given the youth of the Council, appointment
rather than election of members appears to be a wiser choice
for the first two years of existence. For the future, however,
note the evaluation and proposals which follow. 55
D. FUNCTIONS AND PowERs OF THE METROPOLITAN COUNCIL
The Metropolitan Council was not granted operating con-
trol over independent agencies in the area. 56 It therefore does
not reduce the pancake problem of fragmented and partially
overlapping government units. To the extent that these special
service districts fail to include the entire metropolitan area,
tax, service, and economic disparities continue to exist. The
Council, however, represents a significant approach to deal
with problems associated with the spillover effect. Future de-
velopment by independent special service districts will be coor-
dinated by the council. Municipalities will be deterred from
policies of municipal mercantilism, and local planning which has
an impact on the metropolitan area will be regulated. The abil-
ity to achieve this goal stems from the Council's key power to
plan for development in the area, and to review the plans of inde-
pendent agencies and municipalities.
153. ACIR, THE PROBLEM OF SPECIAL DisTucTs IN AmmuCAN Gov-
ERNMENT 67-70 (1964).
154. One commentator referred to special districts as the "new dark
continent of American politics." J. BOLLENS, SPECIAL DISTRICT Gov-
ERNMENT IN THE UNITED STATES 1 (1957).
155. See notes 185-89 infra, and accompanying text.
156. The Ogdahl Bill provided that the new metropolitan unit would
be a "Metropolitan Service Council" and would assume responsibilities
in the area of planning, mosquito control, sewage, and mass transit
through merger with the existing special districts handling each func-
tion.
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1. Planning in the Metropolitan Area
The Council is charged by the legislature with preparation of
a new comprehensive development guide for the metropolitan
area. The guide is to contain "policy statements, goals, stand-
ards, programs, and maps prescribing guides for an orderly and
economic development, public and private, of the metropolitan
area ... and shall recognize and encompass the physical, so-
cial, or economic needs of the metropolitan area .... -157 It is
significant to note that the method of preparation of the guide
outlined by the statutory language includes public hearings.158
The Council is equipped to prepare the guide by virtue of the
transfer to it of the powers and duties of the Metropolitan
Planning Commission. 15
2. Council Review of Plans of Independent Commissions,
Boards and Agencies
In the case of special agencies the Council is to review all
long term operational and development plans which have "an
area-wide effect, a multi-community effect, or . . . a substan-
tial effect on metropolitan development. 160  Provision is made
for the Council to appoint one of its members to serve
with each of the metropolitan special districts. 61 Consequently
the Council is afforded access to the plans of the agencies.
If the referral committee of the Council finds a project is
inconsistent with the development guide, it may direct that the
operation be suspended indefinitely. The affected agency may
then appeal the finding to the entire membership of the Council
for a public hearing. If the Council and the agency are then
unable to agree, the matter shall be presented at the next
regular session of the legislature. 162
The Council's sanction over independent agencies appears
to be far more effective than the sanction over municipali-
ties.103 The net effect of the Council's power is a veto, subject
to being overruled by the legislature. The prospect of waiting
until the next legislative session for appeal, combined with the
157. MiNN. STAT. § 473B.06 (5) (1967).
158. The apparent motivation behind this provision is to allow citi-
zens to have some voice in future development, and to provide affected
parties with a forum before any action is taken.
159. MNN. STAT. § 473B.05 (1967).
160. Id. § 473B.06 (6) (1).
161. Id. § 473B.06(13).
162. Id. § 473B.06(6) (2).
163. See note 165 infra and accompanying text.
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burden of amassing support in the legislature will very likely
provide ample incentive for compliance on the part of metropoli-
tan special districts. The sanction may even be more effective
than it appears. The Council is charged with the "orderly"'
u 4
development of the metropolitan area. Arguably, the Council
can utilize its power of suspension to establish priorities of
"orderly" development by special districts. For example, if
roads were planned and under construction in one part of
the metropolitan area, and the sewer district for that segment
desired to expand services in a different direction, the council
might suspend the latter development plan until the district
established sewer mains in a direction consistent with the
roads. Another example would be if several municipalities
sought to use the same river for sewage effluent. Rather than
allowing the metropolitan district farthest upstream to saturate
the water to the safety point, the council might establish pri-
orities according to the feasibility of alternatives available to
various units.
3. Council Review of Plans and Actions of Municipalities
The Council is also granted the power to review the long
term plans of municipalities. 165 Each municipality "shall sub-
mit" to the Council for comment and recommendation its long
term plans which have a "substantial effect on metropolitan
area development, including but not limited to plans for land
use."' 66 If the Council finds the plans inconsistent with the de-
velopment guide, it may order a sixty day delay in action on the
project. It then is to notify each local unit of government which
may be affected by the plan. Contiguous political units are to
be notified in all cases, thus respecting the values expressed in
the Dumont 67 case. Upon the request of any government which
has been notified, the Council is to conduct a hearing where the
parties involved may present their views. Finally, the Council
is given statutory authority to mediate and attempt to resolve
differences of opinion with respect to the plan in controversy. 108
If the Metropolitan Council disagrees with the proposal of a
municipality, the sanction which may be applied is weak. There
exists a serious gap in the statute in the event the Council de-
164. MNN. STAT. § 473B.06(5) (1967).
165. Id. § 473B.06(7).
166. Id.
167. 15 N.J. 238, 104 A.2d 441 (1954). See note 25 supra, and accom-
panying text.
168. MNw. STAT. § 473B.06(7) (1967).
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clares the sixty day delay, calls a public hearing and yet is
unable to resolve differences of opinion over the proposal in
controversy. The net effect is that a municipality tenacious
enough to hold to its plans and perhaps suffer some adverse
publicity may effectively override metropolitan interests unless
judicial action is initiated. However, it is undesirable to litigate
these questions as it is questionable whether courts are compe-
tent to deal with the technical problems associated therewith,
and, it is agreed, the choice of land uses are best made outside
the courts.169
4. The Vague Standard for Council Intervention: Substantial
Effect on Metropolitan Development
Both as to agencies and municipalities, the Council, not the
agency or unit of government, is to determine whether a given
course of action will have area-wide impact.170 Provision for
review of agency plans represents a new governmental function.
For municipalities the role of the reviewing body has been
strengthened, although the vague standard provided in the stat-
ute presents difficulties. Determination of what has a "substan-
tial effect on metropolitan development" will be a difficult task
for the Council as well as for a municipality.
Three questions may be posed to illustrate elements of the
substantial effect test: First, what types of effects are to be
considered? Second, how widespread must the impact be?
Third, how severe must an effect be to warrant Council review?
An obvious type of effect to be considered is one which economi-
cally injures citizens of nearby communities. For example, in the
Dumont case,"7 placement of a shopping center in a previously
residential area arguably decreased property values in surround-
ing communities. Similarly, a new shopping center might dras-
169. The limitations of the adversary process and the special-
ization of courts evoke serious doubts as to judicial competence
in deciding the proper regional allocation of land resources.
Indeed, the court may find itself interjected into the troubling
and difficult aspects of metropolitan relations and becoming the
center of controversy between the white collar, upper-middle-
class suburb and the increasingly minority group, lower-income
people of the central city.
Haar, Regionalism and Realism in Land Use Planning, 105 U. PA. L. REV.
515, 530 (1957). See also, Note, Zoning Against the Public Welfare:
Judicial Limitations on Municipal Parochialism, 71 YALE L.J. 720, 722
(1962).
170. See note 129, supra.
171. 15 N.J. 238, 104 A.2d 441 (1954). See note 25 supra, and accom-
panying text.
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tically alter traffic patterns and increase the tax load on nearby
communities which were forced to adjust. Another type of
effect is the impact on previous development and planning. In
the example above, sewer or water districts might be forced to
make extensive alteration. A variation in plans might destroy
the feasibility of a planned yet unopened shopping center in a
nearby outlying area.
In Dumont,172 injury to contiguous communities was drama-
tized by the fact that they all bordered the block in question.
However, the injury may be less widespread with fewer com-
munities and private individuals affected, and still warrant
Council review if its impact were severe. Of course, a change in
a land use in a community on the fringe of the metropolitan area
may have neither a widespread nor severe impact on the entire
area. Taken together, however, these three questions must be
faced in determining whether the plans or actions of a munici-
pality substantially affect metropolitan development.
Another difficulty which arises out of the vagueness of the
standard is the danger that a local determination of what sub-
stantially affects metropolitan development may differ from the
Council's view. For example, construction of a shopping center
might be underway following a determination by the locality
that it did not affect area development, only to have the Council
learn of the plan and reach a contrary conclusion. In this cir-
cumstance the language of the statute puts the burden on the
municipality to submit questionable matters.173 It should be
noted that the Council is far less likely to be tardily informed
of the plans of independent districts because the Council has
a representative on each special district board. However, no
similar communications link exists between municipalities and
the Council. Ideally, interested and affected parties might,
through filing complaints,174 provide a check to local action and
prompt early submission of questionable cases to the council.
While the vagueness of the standard presents problems, it
may also be seen to be beneficial to the Council. For example,
in the early years of its existence, members may hesitate to vote
172. Id.
173. MINN. STAT. § 473B.06 (7) (1967).
174. The statute currently makes no provision for the receiving of
complaints by the Council. The authority is implicit, however, since
the statute states that agencies and municipalities "shall submit" plans
or matters which have a substantial effect on metropolitan development.
A unit which proceeded to act on such a plan without submission would
be in violation of the law.
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in favor of intervention in every case where there is arguably a
substantial effect on metropolitan development and thereby pro-
voke a direct confrontation with a locality which is not in com-
plete conformance with the comprehensive guide. The standard
allows the Council to develop public acceptance and a wide base
of support before completely entering the political arena. Thus,
what constitutes a "substantial effect" may become more in-
clusive as time passes and the needs of the metropolitan area dic-
tate, much as the commerce clause of the Federal Constitution
was enlarged during this century.
5. Council Review of Applications for Federal Funds
Perhaps the Council's most important function is the review
of applications for a wide range of federal funds by metropolitan
area government units and independent commissions.'7 5 Where
review by a regional agency is required by federal law, each
unit applying for funds is to transmit the application to the
Council for its comments and recommendations which become a
part of the application. The Council is to comment on whether
or not the proposed project is consistent with the comprehensive
development guide for the area. These applications involve
substantial sums of money to local governmental units-up to
fifty per cent of capital costs for park and sewer projects, for
example, and up to eighty per cent if the criteria for bonus
grants are met.176 Since applications for these funds will ex-
ceed the funds available, the chairman of the Council has pre-
dicted, in reference to the comments and recommendations by
the Council, that "as a practical matter, a negative comment
by the Metropolitan Council will have a conclusive adverse ef-
fect upon the [federal] grant application."' 77 The power of re-
view over applications therefore provides an extremely potent
sanction with which the Council may implement the development
guide and coordinate development in the metropolitan area.
6. Other Duties and Powers
In addition to the duties and powers discussed above, the
Council has been granted authority to develop a center for collec-
tion of data on the metropolitan area for use by the Council and
175. Minm. STAT. § 473B.06 (8) (1967).
176. 42 U.S.C. § 1335 (Supp. II, 1967).
177. Hetland, The Metropolitan Council, 53 Mmw. Mu CIPArxTES
41, 42 (1967).
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other government units' 7 8  It is authorized also to conduct
program feasibility studies and institute demonstration projects
in certain areas.179 It may appear before the Minnesota Munici-
pal Commission if the proceedings involve a change in a bound-
ary of a government unit in the metropolitan area. 80 The
Council is also authorized to study the feasibility of annexing,
enlarging or consolidating government units in the metropoli-
tan area.' 8 ' The close ties of the Council to the legislature are
evidenced by the studies and reports the Council is charged to
provide. The Council is to research the following problems in
the metropolitan area: air pollution, the acquisition and financ-
ing of parks and open spaces in and around the area, water
pollution, disposal of solid waste material, tax equalization, as-
sessment practices and advance land acquisition. 8 2 All stud-
ies are to include recommendations as to the governmental or-
ganization best suited to discharge the powers recommended.
Since the Council is given express statutory authority to recom-
mend legislation for the metropolitan area,'83 the conclusions
drawn from various studies will be directed toward that end and
therefore serve more than a purely educational purpose. Finally,
recommended legislation for the metropolitan area is to include
an analysis of the organization and function of the Council it-
self. 84 Consequently, the Council will play a significant role in
determining the scope of its own functions in the future.
E. EVALUATION AND PROPOSALS
1. Control Over Special Districts
The powers of the Council fall short of enabling it to maxi-
mize the values of welfare and efficiency. First, the Council will
be able to coordinate future development by special service dis-
tricts and thereby promote efficiency. However, the Council is
without authority to coordinate the operations of existing serv-
ice districts (operating powers) as was originally proposed in an
alternative bill. 85 The proposal to give the Council operating
powers sought to render specific independent districts responsi-
ble to an elected body in the area, and not to the legislature.
178. Mn.m. STAT. § 473B.06(9) (1967).
179. Id. § 473B.06 (10).
180. Id. § 473B.06(12) (1).
181. Id. § 473B.06(12) (2).
182. Id. § 473B.04(1) (6).
183. Id. § 473B.04(6).
184. Id.
185. See note 156, supra.
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The benefits of this proposal, particularly under an elected coun-
cil, are that the metropolitan area as a whole would be able to
determine the level and quality of services for which it was
willing to pay. Responsibility and control would be centralized
in the Council, rather than diffused by the pancake effect.
Second, the area would benefit by any economy of scale re-
alized through a broader base of operations of these functions. 8 6
Third, giving the Council operating powers would expand the
territorial jurisdiction of most districts. This would reduce if not
eliminate tax-service cost disparities in different municipalities
within the area. Thus, expanded jurisdiction would make it pos-
sible for the Council to raise adequate revenues in an equitable
manner.
The above discussion may be illustrated by application to
sewage disposal in the metropolitan area. The Minneapolis-St.
Paul Sewer District has boundaries coterminus with the city
limits of the two cities. It supplies service on a contractual basis
to thirty-seven municipalities surrounding the cities. The metro-
politan area is also served by the North Suburban Sanitary Dis-
trict as well as the facilities of municipalities with their own
sewage plants. Finally, some areas are using private septic
tanks.1'8 With operating powers the Council would be able to
take affirmative action to create a consistent system of sewage
disposal in the seven county area. Jurisdiction would include
all of the above districts. The point of view of the entire area
would be represented .and would enable determination of the
regionally most efficient plan of sewage disposal whether a cen-
tral disposal plant or a series of smaller plants. Finally, all citi-
zens would have representation, whereas currently those mu-
nicipalities on a service contract are not represented on the
board of the central district.
The Council, therefore, should be charged with the respon:-
sibility of operating control over independent commissions in the
entire metropolitan area such as the Metropolitan Airport Com-
mission, the Metropolitan Transit Commission, and the sewage
districts. The special district has been an effective' means of
providing services to the metropolitan areas. There is strong
likelihood that the special district will continue to be used to
attack multijurisdictional problems in the metropolitan area.
186. ACIR, PERFORMANCE OF URBAN FUNcTIONS: LOCAL AND AREA-
WIDE 77-78 (1963).
187. Cr=ZNs LEAGuE, REPoRT, A METROPOLITAN COUNIcIL FOR THE
TwiN CITIEs AREA 20 (1967).
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Prospective examples include area parks, a metropolitan zoo,
and area-wide health facilities. It is desirable, however, to main-
tain a balance among local units, the Council and the state.
The state legislature should, therefore, be the judge of what
governmental services and functions demand area-wide atten-
tion. To the extent that any new districts fail to include cer-
tain areas of the metropolitan area there will be financial in-
equities in the revenue collected for their support, as well as a
potential inequity in the quality of service received by citizens
of different municipalities. Control by the Council can substan-
tially lessen these problems.
2. Election of Council Members
The Council as it is organized does not encourage citizen
pressure and control. This stems primarily from the method of
selecting Council members. The election of members rather
than their appointment would render the Council politically ac-
countable to local citizens. The argument that the Council is
basically a policy making body and not purely a coordinating
and administrative agency has great merit. Decisions made by
the council regarding the future development of the area which
will evidence the development guide are founded in policy. The
policy will be formulated on the basis of public hearings and
extensive research, but nonetheless there will be many policy
decisions by the Council which will go into the plan. The crea-
tion of the development guide, and the means of implementing
the guide through controlling the financing of local projects
cannot be called purely "administrative." Moreover, since many
applications by municipalities will be for capital improvements,
the Council's decision one way or the other will affect the tax
rate in that municipality. It follows that though the Council's
present powers are basically negative, the decision whether to
exercise these powers is a legislative decision, and not merely
an executive action. The Council should, therefore, be respon-
sive through the electoral process to the citizens in the Twin
Cities metropolitan area. There seems to be no valid reason to
delay switching to elective representation. If the Council were
charged with the operation of metropolitan area-wide service
districts, the case for an elected council would be stronger. This
would greatly simplify the confusion which arises from frag-
mented government, and provide central area-wide control.
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3. Automatic Reapportionment
Although the Council is presently apportioned according to
population, it would be desirable to provide for automatic re-
apportionment at given intervals, or if growth becomes dispro-
portionate, beyond fixed levels in any given district. The stat-
ute currently is silent on redistricting. Thus any challenge
would have to be resolved through litigation. A wiser policy
seems to be to establish standards before rather than after a con-
flict. Another reason to attempt to keep the appointments to
the Council by state senatorial districts is so that any future
legislative session could grant operating powers and provide for
elected officials without disrupting the continuity of the group
in office.
4. The Council's Power of Review of Municipal Actions
The Council's powers should be strengthened in the area
of reviewing municipal planning and land use conflicts. One
method would be to allow the Council to initiate court action for
the resolution of a conflict between a municipality and the
development guide, or a conflict between two municipalities.
If this approach were followed, the standards set in the develop-
ment guide could be established by statute as prima facie, and
the burden put on the municipality to justify the conflicting use.
However, it is desirable to avoid litigation. The function of the
Council is to mediate and coordinate, not become a party to the
conflict. A wiser policy would be to give the Council the same
type of review over municipalities as it has over agencies: a
veto subject to review by the legislature. However, the resolu-
tions of conflict between municipalities need not be foisted upon
either the courts or the state legislature when it could best be
handled on a metropolitan governmental level.'8 8 The Council,
therefore, should have an indefinite power of suspension over
projects of municipalities which have an impact that is incon-
sistent with the metropolitan interest.
188. It may be argued that, as the actions of local units affect the
entire metropolitan area, so the actions of the metropolitan area affect
the entire state, and therefore the state legislature should ultimately
resolve disputes of this nature. However, this result is undesirable.
For example, there is a lengthy delay between legislative sessions,
whereas the council meets monthly. Secondly, the council's size is bet-
ter suited to the presentation of these issues, as opposed to the entire
legislature. Finally, in the context of the localism-centralism conflict,
there is not apparent need to have appeal both to the council and to
the legislature.
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5. Power to Initiate Action
In connection with the proposal for control over special dis-
tricts, it would be advantageous to vest power in the Council to
initiate actions. Currently the powers of the Council are largely
negative in character. The Council is, therefore, basically a
reacting organization. It must wait and hope local communities
produce plans in accordance with the development guide. A
more sound approach would be to give the Council power to ex-
ercise leadership through initiation of actions. This could be
done, to begin with, with metropolitan parks and open spaces.
For example the Council could apply for federal funds for this
use, and/or use the power of eminent domain to acquire land
for these uses in the future. This result seems preferable to
the saturation of the area with numerous limited purpose inde-
pendent special districts, as it becomes necessary to perform an
increasing number of government services on a metropolitan-
wide scale.
6. The Council and State Agencies
The relation between the Council and other state agencies,
such as the Highway Department or the Pollution Control Agen-
by should be clarified. All these agencies deal with problems
in the metropolitan area. A decision by the Pollution Control
Agency, for example, regarding an industrial site on a river
may upset the plan of another community downstream in the
metropolitan area to use the river for recreational purposes.
Statutory provision should be made for communication between
these agencies and the Council as a minimum. In the event of
conflict between a state-wide agency and the Council, the state
legislature would then be an appropriate place to which to
appeal. Ideally, provision could be made so the agencies could
work together in the earliest planning stages and avoid any con-
flict. 8 9
VI. CONCLUSION
The problems created by massive urban growth are unlikely
to diminish in future years. Problems which ignore jurisdic-
tional boundaries demand a coordinated attack from a govern-
mental authority capable of commanding adequate human and
financial resources. One writer has observed that, "[i]n the per-
189. An informal arrangement has been made with the Highway
Department. Metropolitan Council, Newsletter, vol. 1, no. 6, May 1968.
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spective of the next twenty-five years the question really is not
whether, but how, metropolitan governmental arrangements
within metropolitan areas will be achieved." 190
Minnesota has, through the creation of the Metropolitan
Council, undertaken a significant experiment in metropolitan
area decision making. The Council is a new governmental struc-
ture which has high political feasibility. Appointed represen-
tation on a one-man-one-vote principle avoids the problems of
parochialism which have plagued constituent unit structures such
as voluntary councils of governments and federalism. The Coun-
cil is in a position to coordinate the development of special dis-
tricts. Its procedure for review over municipal projects which
affect the metropolitan area should reduce clashes between lo-
cal units arising from policies of "municipal mercantilism."
Finally, the function of review of applications for federal funds
will allow the Council some leverage with which to implement
area development according to a plan rather than in the hap-
hazard manner of the past.
The Metropolitan Council furthermore illustrates the role
of the state government in handling metropolitan problems, for
the state government has the responsibility to establish local
governmental structures capable of meeting the demands of
citizens. Finally, by creating a structure tied closely to the
legislature, the state has reasserted itself in the balance of the
federal system. Federal-urban grants flow through an arm of
the state, and, arguably, program coordination can be achieved
on all levels of government.
It seems paradoxical at first blush to create a new layer of
government to coordinate the many which currently exist. How-
ever, it must be recognized that any reorganization of govern-
ment in metropolitan areas involves fundamental redistribution
of decision making power. If democratic values are to be re-
alized, decision making should be placed on every level where
citizens have both a need and a desire to participate. This rea-
soning applies with equal strength to decision making in the
ghetto' 91 as well as to the broader metropolitan area. In this
respect the Metropolitan Council has great potential to evolve
into area-wide democratic machinery to deal with metropolitan
problems.
190. Dixon, New Constitutional Forms For Metropolis: Reapportioned
County Boards; Local Councils of Governments, 30 LAw & CONTEMP.
PROB. 57, 68 (1965).
191. See REPORT OF THE NATIONAL ADvisoRY ComAnIssIoN ON CIVIL
DIsoRDERs 283-99 (Bantam ed. 1968).
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